A Friendship Forged in History
On a cool March evening in Budapest, Polish and Hungarian flags flutter side by side outside a conference hall where diplomats, historians, and policy analysts have gathered to mark a little-known anniversary. The date doesn’t correspond to any EU treaty or NATO milestone. It commemorates the day in 2007 when the Hungarian city of Győr and the Polish city of Poznań formally declared themselves sister cities—an act that, for many, symbolises the stubborn persistence of a bond that predates the European Union by centuries.
Polish-Hungarian relations are often described in sentimental terms. Politicians in both countries regularly invoke the proverb Polak, Węgier — dwa bratanki, i do szabli, i do szklanki (“Pole and Hungarian cousins be, good for fight and good for party”). Yet behind the folksy rhetoric lies a relationship that has real, measurable consequences for how Central Europe organises itself. When Warsaw and Budapest align—or clash—the reverberations are felt from Brussels to Kyiv.
The Visegrád Engine: More Than a Talking Shop
To understand the contemporary weight of Polish-Hungarian ties, one must start with the Visegrád Group, or V4, which also includes the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The grouping was born in 1991, when the presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland met in the Hungarian castle town of Visegrád to coordinate their post-communist integration into Western institutions. Today, the V4 is often dismissed as a loose coalition that punches below its weight. That assessment misses the point.
When Poland and Hungary find common ground, the V4 becomes a formidable bloc. During the 2015 migration crisis, the two countries led the group’s resistance to mandatory EU relocation quotas, framing their opposition in terms of national sovereignty and cultural identity. The joint stance not only hardened the V4’s negotiating position but also emboldened other member states to voice reservations. In subsequent years, the Polish-Hungarian axis became the core of a broader illiberal network within the EU, influencing debates on rule of law, judicial reform, and media freedom.
Yet the V4 is not a monolith, and the Polish-Hungarian partnership is not always smooth. On energy policy, for instance, the two diverge sharply. Poland has staked its energy future on reducing dependence on Russian gas through LNG terminals and the Baltic Pipe. Hungary, under Viktor Orbán’s government, has deepened its energy ties with Moscow, signing long-term gas deals that critics say undermine EU efforts to diversify supply. This tension exposes a fault line that runs through the entire region: how to balance historical suspicion of Russia with pragmatic economic needs.
The Orbán-PiS Dynamic: Alignment and Its Limits
For much of the past decade, the relationship between Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) parties appeared symbiotic. Both governments championed a vision of “illiberal democracy” that prioritised national sovereignty, traditional values, and a strong executive. They defended each other in EU forums, with Hungary blocking sanctions against Poland and Poland returning the favour when Brussels targeted Budapest over democratic backsliding.
This mutual defence mechanism, often called a “non-aggression pact” among analysts, reshaped EU internal politics. It forced the European Commission to pursue Article 7 procedures against both countries simultaneously, a cumbersome process that revealed the limits of the EU’s enforcement tools. It also created a precedent: two medium-sized member states, acting in concert, could effectively paralyse the Union’s disciplinary machinery.
But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed the boundaries of this partnership. Poland, with its deep-rooted wariness of Moscow and its own painful historical experiences, became one of Kyiv’s most ardent supporters, supplying weapons, hosting millions of refugees, and pushing for the toughest possible sanctions on Russia. Hungary, while condemning the invasion and accepting refugees, refused to allow weapons shipments across its territory and consistently watered down EU sanctions packages. Orbán’s government maintained open channels with the Kremlin, arguing that Hungary’s energy security depended on it.
This divergence has not broken the Polish-Hungarian relationship, but it has injected a new element of realism. Polish diplomats privately express frustration that Budapest’s stance complicates the V4’s credibility. Hungarian officials, for their part, point to the economic pain that sanctions inflict on their country and question whether Poland’s hawkish line is sustainable. The result is a relationship that is more transactional than it was five years ago, but still far from hostile.
Regional Infrastructure and the Connectivity Agenda
Beyond high politics, Polish-Hungarian cooperation has a concrete, infrastructural dimension. The Via Carpathia, a transnational highway project stretching from Lithuania to Greece, runs through both countries and has benefited from coordinated lobbying in Brussels. The project, once a niche idea promoted by Polish President Lech Kaczyński, has gained momentum precisely because Warsaw and Budapest have jointly pushed it as a strategic priority for the EU’s eastern flank.
Energy infrastructure tells a more complicated story. Poland’s diversification strategy—centred on the Świnoujście LNG terminal and the Baltic Pipe—has been paired with efforts to create a north-south gas corridor that could supply Hungary and other V4 states with non-Russian gas. Hungary has participated in these discussions but has not committed to reorienting its supply. The gap between the two countries’ energy strategies underscores a broader truth: regional cooperation is strongest when it aligns with national interests, and weakest when those interests conflict.
Trade figures reflect a similar pattern. Bilateral trade between Poland and Hungary has grown steadily, reaching over €10 billion annually. Polish companies have invested heavily in Hungarian manufacturing and services, while Hungarian firms have expanded in Polish construction and agribusiness. This economic interdependence creates a constituency for stability that tempers political disagreements. Business associations in both countries have lobbied their governments to avoid letting diplomatic spats disrupt commercial ties.
Historical Memory as Political Currency
No analysis of Polish-Hungarian relations is complete without acknowledging the role of historical memory. Both countries share a narrative of victimhood at the hands of great powers, a memory of betrayed revolutions (1956 in Hungary, 1980-81 in Poland), and a tradition of mutual solidarity that stretches back to the Middle Ages. This shared memory is not just cultural wallpaper; it is actively mobilised by political leaders to justify contemporary positions.
When Orbán defends his government’s media laws, he invokes the struggle against communist censorship. When PiS leaders resist EU migration policies, they reference Poland’s experience of partition and occupation. The references resonate across borders because the historical grammar is similar. This creates a regional discourse that frames Central Europe as a distinct moral community, defined by its resistance to external domination—whether from Moscow, Brussels, or Washington.
Critics argue that this memory politics often verges on myth-making and can be used to deflect legitimate criticism. Yet its potency is undeniable. It provides a deep well of emotional legitimacy that other regional groupings lack. A V4 summit is not just a bureaucratic meeting; it is, in the eyes of its participants, a gathering of nations that understand each other in ways that Western Europeans cannot.
The Shadow of Brussels and the Future of the V4
The evolving relationship between Poland and Hungary cannot be understood in isolation from the broader EU context. The election of a new Polish government in late 2023, led by Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition, has introduced a new variable. Tusk, a former European Council president, has pledged to restore Poland’s position at the heart of EU decision-making and to repair relations with Berlin and Paris. This has raised questions about whether the Polish-Hungarian axis will weaken.
Early signs suggest a recalibration rather than a rupture. Tusk has been critical of Orbán’s approach to Russia and has signalled that Poland will no longer act as Hungary’s automatic defender in rule-of-law disputes. But he has also emphasised the importance of the V4 and has avoided personal attacks on Orbán. Hungarian officials, for their part, have adopted a wait-and-see approach, aware that Poland’s domestic politics remain volatile and that future elections could return a more sympathetic government.
What does this mean for regional politics? The most likely scenario is a more fragmented V4, in which the Czech Republic and Slovakia play a larger role as mediators between the Polish and Hungarian positions. The Czech government, under Petr Fiala, shares Poland’s hawkish stance on Russia but is less confrontational with Brussels. Slovakia’s Robert Fico, by contrast, has echoed some of Orbán’s rhetoric on sovereignty and migration, creating a potential new alignment. The centre of gravity is shifting.
Lessons for the Wider Region
The Polish-Hungarian relationship offers lessons that extend beyond Central Europe. It demonstrates that medium-sized states can shape EU policy when they act in concert, but also that such cooperation is brittle when core interests diverge. It shows that historical memory can be a powerful tool of political mobilisation, but also that it can lock countries into narratives that complicate pragmatic problem-solving.
For countries in the Western Balkans, which aspire to EU membership, the Polish-Hungarian experience is both inspiring and cautionary. It suggests that regional cooperation can accelerate integration, but also that it can create friction with Brussels if it is perceived as a bloc formed to obstruct rather than to contribute. For the EU itself, the lesson is that treating Central Europe as a homogeneous region is a mistake. The differences between Warsaw and Budapest are as significant as their similarities.
As one Polish diplomat remarked during a recent track-two dialogue, “We are not married to Hungary. We are in a long-term relationship that has survived many crises. But we have our own apartment now, and we are decorating it differently.” The metaphor captures the current moment well. The bond endures, but it no longer dictates every move.
FAQ: Polish-Hungarian Relations and Regional Politics
Why do Poland and Hungary have such a close historical relationship?
The friendship dates back to the Middle Ages, when Polish and Hungarian monarchs formed dynastic unions and military alliances. In the modern era, both nations shared experiences of resistance against larger imperial powers, solidarity during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Polish Solidarity movement, and a parallel path toward NATO and EU membership after the Cold War. This deep historical connection is often cited by politicians and resonates strongly with publics in both countries.
How does the Polish-Hungarian partnership affect EU decision-making?
When Poland and Hungary align, they can form a blocking minority within the Visegrád Group and influence broader EU debates, particularly on issues of sovereignty, migration, and rule of law. Their mutual defence against EU disciplinary measures has exposed the limits of the Article 7 procedure. However, their influence is greatest when they find common cause with other member states; when they diverge—for example, on Russia policy—their collective weight diminishes.
Has the war in Ukraine changed Polish-Hungarian relations permanently?
The war has introduced a serious and visible rift, with Poland strongly supporting Ukraine militarily and politically, while Hungary has maintained a more ambivalent stance and continued energy cooperation with Russia. This divergence is unlikely to disappear soon, but it has not severed the relationship. Both governments continue to cooperate on infrastructure, trade, and some EU dossiers, and they share an interest in maintaining V4 cohesion. The relationship has become more pragmatic and less ideological, but it remains functional.
The Polish-Hungarian partnership will continue to evolve as both countries navigate domestic political changes, energy transitions, and the shifting geopolitics of Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. It remains one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in the region—not because it is always harmonious, but because it forces both Warsaw and Budapest to define what kind of Europe they want to build.