Last week I walked through Warsaw’s Praga district and passed a row of neon signs — one for a Chinese electronics firm, another for an American coffee chain, a third for a Polish software house. That street, in that moment, felt like a map of our region’s predicament. For Poland, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, the sharpening contest between the United States and China is not some abstraction debated in distant think tanks. It’s a daily reality that shapes investment decisions, supply chains, and political alignments. Our geography, history, and economic structure have placed us at a crossing point where the Atlantic meets the New Silk Road.
The standard binary framing — choose America or choose China — misreads the Central European condition. Our economies are mid-sized, deeply woven into Germany’s export machine, yet increasingly reliant on Asian components and, in some cases, Chinese capital. Our security architecture is anchored firmly in NATO, but our energy and infrastructure needs pull in multiple directions. The task isn’t to pick a side once and for all. It’s to manage a continuous balancing act that preserves sovereignty, builds resilience, and avoids becoming a mere playing field for larger powers.
The Economic Weave: Trade, Investment, and Dependency
Central Europe’s economic ties with both the US and China have deepened markedly over the past decade, but they follow different patterns. American involvement leans heavily toward services, high-end manufacturing, and security-related technologies. US firms like Google, IBM, and Microsoft operate major engineering hubs in Kraków, Prague, and Budapest — creating skilled jobs and transferring organizational practices. On trade, the US runs a deficit with most Visegrád economies, but the relationship is less about goods and more about standards: data governance, intellectual property, and investment screening.
China’s footprint is more physical and more politically charged. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese state-owned enterprises have financed and built highways in Serbia, port terminals in Greece, and rail links that connect to our region. In Hungary, Chinese battery manufacturers like CATL have announced gigafactories that will supply Europe’s electric vehicle transition. For Poland, Chinese exports of electronics, machinery, and solar panels have soared, while Polish food producers eye the Chinese market with cautious optimism. The numbers tell a clear story: China is our largest supplier of imported goods outside the EU, and for some segments — rare earths, active pharmaceutical ingredients, photovoltaic cells — the dependency is acute.
This dual exposure creates a specific vulnerability. When the US imposes sanctions on Chinese tech firms, our supply chains feel the tremor. When China restricts exports of critical minerals, our green transition plans wobble. The challenge is not to sever ties — that would be self-defeating — but to spot where dependencies bunch up and to build buffers.
Mapping Dependencies: A Sectoral View
To move beyond generalities, it helps to break down the relationship by sector:
- Automotive and batteries: The region’s single most important industrial sector is pivoting to electric vehicles. Chinese firms control a dominant share of battery cell production and refined lithium. Hungary and Poland are actively courting these investments, but they’re doing so under US scrutiny of supply chain security.
- Digital infrastructure: 5G networks became the emblematic battleground. The US campaigned heavily against Huawei, and most Visegrád governments eventually adopted security frameworks that sidelined the company. Yet Chinese-made routers and cloud services still permeate the enterprise market.
- Pharmaceuticals: The pandemic laid bare our reliance on Chinese active ingredients. Reshoring production is slow and costly, leaving regulators to balance price controls with supply chain oversight.
- Energy: While Central Europe’s immediate energy crisis was triggered by Russian gas, China’s role as a manufacturer of solar panels and a processor of lithium for storage gives it indirect influence over our energy transition pace.
The Security Calculus: NATO, Nuclear Umbrella, and Cyber Threats
On security, the picture is stark. Article 5 and the US nuclear umbrella remain the bedrock of Central European defense. Poland’s 2022 decision to purchase Abrams tanks, F-35 jets, and Patriot missile systems from the US — a multibillion-euro deal — signaled an unambiguous strategic choice. The war in Ukraine has reinforced that orientation: Russian aggression makes the American security guarantee non-negotiable. No other power, and certainly not China, can offer the military deterrence that Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania require.
Yet security today extends beyond conventional warfare. Cyberspace, energy coercion, and economic intimidation are all part of the threat matrix. Here, the US and its allies provide collective defense frameworks, but they also demand compliance with export controls on semiconductor equipment and dual-use technologies. For Czechia and Slovakia, which host significant electronics manufacturing, these controls can clash with commercial interests. The balancing act requires a clear-headed assessment: security ties with the US are not a bargaining chip to be traded for Chinese investment. They are a structural foundation that must be protected, even when it costs money.
Cyber and Information Warfare
Both the US and China actively monitor — and sometimes shape — the information environment in Central Europe. American technology companies dominate social media platforms, giving Washington indirect influence over public discourse. China, through state media partnerships and scholarship programs, cultivates a softer image. The region has seen disinformation campaigns linked to both sides, often aimed at discrediting the EU or amplifying political divisions. Building societal resilience — through media literacy, transparent funding of political parties, and independent journalism — is a domestic task that no external ally can perform for us.
Political Currents: Populism, Sovereignty, and the Third Way Temptation
Central European politics has long been a laboratory for ideological hybrids. Hungary’s government, under Fidesz, has pursued a policy of “Eastern Opening” that combines deep economic partnership with China and strident criticism of the EU, all while remaining a NATO member. Poland’s Law and Justice party, before its 2023 electoral defeat, mixed anti-German rhetoric with lavish US arms purchases and a hard line on Russia. Czech and Slovak leaders have oscillated between Atlanticism and cautious engagement with Beijing, often driven by business lobbies.
This volatility is not irrational. It reflects a genuine search for agency. Smaller states resent being lectured by larger ones, whether the lecture comes from Washington on rule of law or from Brussels on migration. China has been skillful at exploiting this resentment, offering investment without explicit political conditions — at least on the surface. The “17+1” format (originally 17 Central and Eastern European countries plus China) was Beijing’s most visible attempt to institutionalize a separate channel, though it has lost momentum as several participants have grown wary.
The populist temptation is to frame the choice as one between subservience to Washington or subservience to Beijing, and then to claim a nationalist third way. In practice, such a posture often obscures a drift toward Chinese economic dependence without the counterweight of a security alliance. The more sober approach is to accept that alliances are not pristine, but that some — those based on democratic accountability and mutual defense — are qualitatively different from transactional partnerships.
Practical Navigation: A Strategy of Managed Multi-Alignment
Central Europe does not need to invent a grand doctrine. It needs a set of pragmatic policies that together form a coherent whole. I propose four pillars:
- Strategic Investment Screening: Every Visegrád country now has a foreign investment review mechanism, but their rigor varies. Poland’s 2020 screening law covers critical infrastructure, energy, and data processing, yet implementation remains under-resourced. A region-wide framework, coordinated with the EU’s proposed screening regulation, would prevent a race to the bottom. The goal is not to block Chinese capital — much of it is welcome — but to ensure that critical sectors are not transferred without due diligence.
- Supply Chain Dual-Sourcing: Governments cannot mandate every corporate purchasing decision, but they can incentivize diversification. Tax credits for pharmaceutical companies that maintain dual API sources, public procurement rules that require alternative suppliers in sensitive categories, and stockpile agreements for rare minerals are all tools within reach. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act provides a vehicle for collective action.
- Technology Sovereignty: The region should double down on its homegrown tech strengths. Poland’s gaming industry, Czechia’s cybersecurity firms, and Hungary’s AI research clusters are assets that reduce dependence on imported platforms. European funds for digital innovation should be channeled not into generic infrastructure but into projects that create viable alternatives to dominant US and Chinese cloud services.
- Transparent Diplomacy: Central European governments should publicly disclose the terms of major agreements with Chinese entities, as some Western European countries have begun to do. Secrecy breeds suspicion and invites corruption. A clear, published framework for engagement — modeled on the EU’s connectivity strategy — would signal that the region is open for business but not for sale.
The German Factor
No analysis of Central Europe’s position makes sense without accounting for Germany. Berlin’s own China policy is in flux, moving from “change through trade” to a more skeptical de-risking posture. As Germany goes, so go its supply chains, which extend deep into Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. If Germany decouples selectively from Chinese inputs, Central European subsidiaries will be forced to follow. This creates an opportunity: rather than passively adapting, Visegrád governments can engage Berlin and Brussels early, shaping the terms of de-risking to protect local jobs and investment.
FAQ: Central Europe and the US-China Dynamic
Is Central Europe more dependent on the US or China economically?
The dependency is asymmetric. On trade in goods, China is a larger partner — especially for imports. On investment, the picture is mixed: US firms dominate in high-value services and R&D centers, while Chinese investment has been concentrated in infrastructure, manufacturing, and logistics. On security and technology standards, the US relationship is foundational. The key point is that the region cannot afford to lose either market or partner, but the nature of the dependence differs.
How has the war in Ukraine changed the calculus?
The war has made the US security guarantee more vital than ever. At the same time, it has disrupted supply chains and pushed energy diversification to the top of the agenda. Paradoxically, this has opened space for Chinese solar and battery technology, even as political rhetoric against Beijing has hardened. The result is a more tangled, less coherent policy environment.
What role can the European Union play in this balancing act?
The EU is the essential multiplier for Central European influence. Alone, Slovakia or Hungary has limited bargaining power. Within the EU’s single market and trade policy, the region can shape de-risking instruments, investment screening, and infrastructure funding. The Visegrád Group’s effectiveness depends on its ability to coordinate within EU institutions rather than acting as a spoiler.
Can Central Europe maintain good relations with both powers simultaneously?
Yes, but not without friction. Maintaining good relations does not mean equidistance; it means managing each relationship on its own terms. With the US, the anchor is NATO and shared democratic values. With China, the anchor is commercial pragmatism, bounded by security red lines. The region’s leaders must resist the temptation to play one power against the other in a transactional game — that strategy tends to backfire on smaller states.