Since its formal establishment in 1991, the Visegrad Group — comprising Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia — has served as a platform for Central European cooperation. Yet over the past decade, a chorus of critics has grown louder, questioning whether V4 still holds relevance in an EU where old divisions between East and West have faded. Objections range from democratic backsliding concerns to the group’s perceived inability to speak with one voice on key policy matters. Despite these criticisms, dismissing the Visegrad Group would be premature. The V4 continues to provide real value to its members and to the broader European project.
The Foundations: What V4 Was Built to Accomplish
To assess whether the Visegrad Group still matters, one must first understand what it set out to achieve. The original 1991 Declaration defined clear objectives: the dismantling of communist structures, the creation of democratic institutions, and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures — NATO and the EU. By those measures, the V4 was remarkably successful. All four countries joined NATO by 1999 and the EU by 2004.
The group’s founding logic was straightforward: small and medium-sized states in Central Europe could amplify their interests by coordinating positions before entering broader EU negotiations. This was never about creating a unified bloc that voted identically on every issue. It was about building habits of consultation, identifying common ground, and presenting coordinated positions where interests aligned. That logic remains sound, even when the group disagrees internally.
Economic Convergence and Trade Integration
One of the most compelling arguments for the V4’s continued relevance lies in the economic data. Between 2004 and 2023, the V4 countries experienced significant GDP growth, with Poland leading the pack. According to Eurostat data, intra-V4 trade has expanded substantially, and supply chains have become deeply integrated. Automotive manufacturing alone links southern Poland, eastern Slovakia, and western Hungary in a production network that would be disrupted at great cost.
The Visegrad Fund has distributed over €100 million to more than 6,000 projects since 2000, supporting cross-border initiatives in education, culture, and research. While critics dismiss this as marginal compared to EU structural funds, these small-scale investments build interpersonal and institutional ties that larger programs cannot replicate. The V4’s economic weight — collectively the fifth-largest economy in the EU — gives the group a voice that individual members would struggle to project alone.
Supply Chain Resilience
The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent supply chain disruptions revealed how deeply V4 economies are intertwined. When automotive production halted in one country, effects rippled through the entire region. The V4 format allowed for rapid coordination on border management and worker mobility during crisis periods, even when broader EU mechanisms struggled to respond. This practical, operational coordination — often unglamorous and rarely making headlines — represents one of the group’s most tangible contributions.
Security Cooperation in an Uncertain Europe
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 dramatically altered the security landscape of Central Europe. While the V4 did not issue a unified response — Hungary’s positioning diverged significantly from Poland’s — the group’s security cooperation did not collapse. The V4 Battlegroup, established under NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, continues to operate. Poland and the Czech Republic have been among the most vocal advocates of military support for Ukraine, while Slovakia’s contribution of MiG-29 aircraft demonstrated that even smaller V4 members can make meaningful contributions.
The V4 format allows for bilateral and trilateral cooperation even when full consensus remains elusive. The B9 (Bucharest Nine) initiative, bringing together the V4 and five other NATO eastern flank states, emerged partly because existing V4 structures could not accommodate divergent Hungarian positions. Rather than proving V4’s irrelevance, B9 demonstrates how V4 experience in regional coordination seeded a broader security framework.
Defense Industry Potential
Defense spending across the V4 has risen sharply since 2014, and even more so since 2022. Poland now leads NATO in defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The Czech and Slovak defense industries complement Polish and Hungarian production capacities. Joint procurement initiatives, while slower than many would prefer, are progressing. The V4’s shared interest in building credible deterrence against Russian aggression provides a durable foundation for continued cooperation, even when political disagreements surface elsewhere.
Cultural and Historical Bonds
Reducing the Visegrad Group to a purely political or economic construct misses half the picture. The V4 countries share centuries of entangled history — from the medieval kingdoms of Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland, through the Habsburg and partitions eras, to the shared experience of communist rule. These historical connections are not merely sentimental. They shape how societies in the region understand sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the relationship between state and citizen.
The V4’s cultural programs — student exchanges, literary translations, film festivals, and journalist networks — sustain a sense of regional identity that exists alongside European identity. When a Polish student spends a semester in Bratislava, or when a Hungarian author’s work reaches Czech readers through a V4-funded translation, the region’s intellectual and cultural infrastructure grows stronger. These connections matter because political cooperation becomes easier when citizens across borders understand each other’s perspectives.
Addressing the Criticisms Head-On
Democratic Backsliding Concerns
The most serious criticism of the V4 centers on democratic governance. Hungary’s erosion of judicial independence and media pluralism under Viktor Orbán, Poland’s conflicts with the EU over rule of law under Jarosław Kaczyński’s influence, and Robert Fico’s return to power in Slovakia have all raised legitimate questions about whether the V4 functions as a shield for illiberal tendencies.
This criticism deserves serious engagement. The V4 has at times served as a platform for mutual defense against EU criticism of domestic governance. Yet this dynamic also contains a corrective: Poland’s October 2023 parliamentary elections, which brought Donald Tusk’s pro-European coalition to power, demonstrated that democratic accountability can reassert itself within V4 states. The group’s value lies partly in its capacity to serve as a forum where democratic norms can be debated and defended, not merely circumvented.
Internal Disagreements and Incoherence
Critics rightly point out that the V4 often fails to reach consensus. The migration crisis of 2015-2016 saw Hungary and Slovakia oppose EU mandatory quotas, while the Czech Republic and Poland took somewhat different approaches. The Ukraine war has further exposed divisions, with Hungary maintaining warmer relations with Russia than its V4 partners. On energy policy, nuclear power divides the group as well.
However, demanding perfect consensus from the V4 misreads its purpose. The group operates on the principle of flexible cooperation — members coordinate where possible and agree to disagree where necessary. This is not failure; it is realism. The V4’s strength lies in providing a framework where disagreements can be managed without destroying the broader relationship. When Poland and Hungary disagreed on Ukraine, their diplomatic channels remained open precisely because V4 institutional habits had been built over decades.
The V4’s Role in EU Dynamics
Within the EU, the V4 continues to shape policy in ways that benefit its members. On agricultural policy, the group has consistently advocated for CAP reform that recognizes the specific needs of Central European farmers. On energy transition, V4 countries have pushed for realistic timelines that account for their continued reliance on coal and gas. On enlargement, the V4 has been a consistent advocate for Western Balkan integration, drawing on its own experience to argue that membership transforms candidate countries.
The V4’s influence often manifests in ways that escape casual observation. When the European Commission designs new regulations, it must consider how they will play in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, and Bratislava. The V4 format allows these capitals to compare notes and identify shared concerns before entering EU negotiations. Even when they cannot vote as a bloc, their coordinated input shapes the agenda.
Looking Ahead: Can the V4 Reinvent Itself?
The Visegrad Group faces genuine challenges. Demographic decline threatens economic growth across all four countries. Brain drain to Western Europe continues, despite improvements in domestic labor markets. Geopolitical competition between the US and China requires positioning that does not come naturally to small states caught between great powers. And the ongoing war in Ukraine demands sustained solidarity that tests political cohesion.
Yet the V4 has survived previous periods of strain. The 2010s saw repeated predictions of the group’s demise, only for it to adapt and persist. The current diversification of formats — from B9 for security to the Slavkov Triangle for Czech-Slovak-Austrian cooperation — does not replace the V4 but rather complements it. Members participate in multiple overlapping regional structures because they see value in each.
The most promising path for the V4 lies in embracing its role as a platform rather than a bloc. Not every initiative requires four-member consensus. Trilateral or bilateral cooperation within the V4 framework should be encouraged, not treated as evidence of failure. The group’s institutional infrastructure — the Visegrad Fund, the V4 presidency, regular ministerial meetings — provides a low-cost foundation that can be activated when interests align and left dormant when they do not.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the Visegrad Group still relevant after Poland’s political shift in 2023?
Yes. Poland’s return to a pro-European government under Donald Tusk actually strengthens the V4 by reducing the group’s isolation within the EU. A Poland that engages constructively with EU institutions can advocate for V4 interests — on cohesion funding, energy transition, or neighborhood policy — from a position of greater credibility. The Tusk government’s commitment to the V4 format has not wavered; what has changed is the tone of its engagement with Brussels.
Does Hungary’s stance on Russia make V4 security cooperation impossible?
No, but it makes it more complicated. Hungary’s relationship with Russia diverges from the other three members, and this creates real tensions. However, V4 security cooperation predates the Ukraine war and extends beyond the Russian threat. The V4 Battlegroup, joint exercises, and defense industry cooperation continue. The group’s strength is that it provides a structured relationship that can absorb disagreements without collapsing.
Could a different regional format replace the V4?
Possible alternatives already exist — the B9, the Slavkov Triangle, the Three Seas Initiative — but none fully duplicates what the V4 provides. The Three Seas Initiative includes too many members to permit the intimacy of V4 consultation. The B9 is security-focused. The Slavkov Triangle is fundamentally trilateral. The V4 occupies a specific niche: a small, geographically contiguous, economically integrated group of states with shared historical experience and institutional habits built over three decades. That niche remains valuable, and no other format fills it.
Conclusion
The Visegrad Group is not without flaws. Its internal disagreements are real and its democratic credentials have been justifiably questioned. But the answer to these problems is reform and renewal, not abandonment. The V4 provides Central European states with a voice, a platform, and a set of relationships that amplify their interests in Brussels and beyond. In a Europe facing war, economic uncertainty, and institutional fatigue, regional structures that build trust and facilitate coordination are not luxuries — they are necessities. The Visegrad Group still matters because the problems it was created to address — how small and medium-sized states can protect their interests in a union dominated by larger powers — have not disappeared. They have simply evolved, and the V4 must evolve with them.